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A retailer following a competition-based dynamic pricing strategy tracks competitors’ price changes and
then must answer the following questions: (1) Should the retailer respond? (2) If so, respond to whom?
(3) How much of a response? (4) And on which products? The answers require unbiased measures of price
elasticity as well as accurate knowledge of competitor significance and the extent to which consumers com-
pare prices across retailers. To quantify these factors empirically, there are two key challenges: first, the
endogeneity associated with almost any type of observational data, where prices are correlated with demand
shocks observable to pricing managers but not to researchers; and second, the absence of competitor sales
information, which prevents efficient estimation of a full consumer-choice model. We address the first issue
by conducting a field experiment with randomized prices. We resolve the second issue by proposing an iden-
tification strategy that exploits the retailer’s own and competitors’ stock-outs as a valid source of variation
to the consumer choice set. We estimate an empirical model capturing consumer choices among substitutable
products from multiple retailers. Based on the estimates, we propose a best-response pricing strategy that
takes into account consumer choice behavior, competitors’ actions, and supply parameters (procurement
costs, margin target, and manufacturer price restrictions). We test our algorithm through a carefully con-
trolled live experiment that lasts for five weeks. The experiment documents an 11 percent revenue increase,
while maintaining margin above a retailer specified target.
Key words : Online Retailing, Competition-Based Dynamic Pricing, Field Experiments, Stock-outs,
Consumer Choice
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1. Introduction
The Internet has changed the way price information is disseminated. With just a few clicks con-
sumers are able to obtain price information from multiple retailers. This increased price trans-
parency induces fierce competition among online retailers and requires real-time monitoring and
quick responses to competition.1
The price transparency enjoyed by consumers has prompted many online retailers to adopt a
competition-based pricing strategy in which they constantly monitor competitors prices and use
this as an input in setting their own prices. For example, they may always charge x dollars or
x percent lower or higher than a target competitor or any competitor with the lowest price. Not
surprisingly, retailers miss several opportunities with such simple heuristics. Instead, they should
ask themselves, shouldn’t my reaction depend on consumers’ elasticity to prices? Shouldn’t my
reaction depend on the extent to which consumers compare prices across retailers? Shouldn’t my
reaction depend on changes in availability at competing retailers? Should I still match prices if
it seems like the competitor made a pricing mistake? We address exactly these questions in this
paper.
Determining the best-response price requires knowing how demand reacts to price changes. This
is a challenging task. Simply regressing historical sales on prices while controlling for observable
product characteristics and seasonality usually suffers from endogeneity issues (see Villas-Boas
and Winer 1999). Pricing managers often observe demand signals that we researchers do not,
such as unobserved product characteristics or a temporal surge in demand due to manufacturer
advertisements, and they may adjust prices based on observed demand signals. If they increase price
when they see a demand surge, this creates a correlation that fallaciously implies a higher price
results in higher demand. Moreover, the relationship between demand and price will be further
confounded by the price levels of substitutable products that the same retailer offers and the price
levels of the same product that the competition offers.
To determine the best-response price we also need to understand the extent to which consumers
compare prices across retailers. In the situation where consumers always choose the cheapest retailer
for any product they buy, we need to either charge the lowest price in the market or accept no
sales. However, in the situation where consumers consider both prices and retail channels when
making purchase decisions, we may not need to match every single price that a competitor charges,
in particular for products with low price elasticities and for competitors that are less important.
Accurately assessing the level of consumer engagement in price comparison across retailers will
allow targeted price responses that are efficient and effective.
1 Coming soon: Toilet paper priced like airline tickets. The Wall Street Journal. September 5, 2012.
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We partnered with a leading Chinese online retailer, which we will refer to as the retail partner
hereafter, to address these challenges. First, we developed a demand model to understand how
consumers make choices when given a set of substitutable products from multiple retailers. Our
model resolves a key challenge many retailers face when attempting to implement a choice model to
understand consumer purchase decisions: absence of competitor sales information. Our solution is
to use our own and competitor stock-outs as an identification strategy, which serves as a source of
temporary variations to the consumer choice set. These variations provide the additional moment
conditions necessary to estimate consumer preferences of retailers and their level of engagement
in comparing prices across retailers. Next, we conduct a randomized price experiment to obtain
unbiased estimates of price elasticities addressing the endogeneity challenge. In this experiment,
we randomly assign prices to each product under study using a fractional factorial design. After
obtaining model estimates using the data generated during the one-month experiment period, we
solve a constrained optimization problem to define optimal price responses to competitor price
changes. Finally, in collaboration with our retail partner, we evaluate the performance of our best-
response pricing algorithm through a carefully controlled field experiment. The daily categorical
revenue of the treatment group increases by 11 percent following our methodology, compared to
the control group for the same before and after periods.
Our paper contributes to the operations management literature and to retail practice in a number
of ways. First, we propose a parsimonious choice model that captures the key tension involved in
this competitive environment, and we propose an identification strategy using own and competitor
stock-outs to provide additional moment conditions in the absence of competitor sales information.
Second, we conduct a randomized price experiment in the field to obtain unbiased measures
of price elasticities, thereby overcoming the limitations of using observational data. We provide
examples to illustrate several problems with observational data. Estimates of price elasticities
can show up as statistically insignificant from zero, that is, non-distinguishable from inelastic
demand, due to lack of price variations historically, which happens very often when selling millions
of products online. Sometimes, even if the price of a product itself varied historically, it follows
closely competitors prices such that there is little price variation comparatively. In this situation,
it is impossible to distinguish how demand responds to changes in one retailer’s own price versus
changes in the competition price. Moreover, estimates of price elasticities can be biased upward
when ignoring the fact that retail managers make price decisions based on private demand signals.
Duncan Painter, the CEO of WGSN Group, a firm specializes in fashion forecasting for retailers,
commented that they often use price as a proxy for sales—discounted price implies low sales and
vice versa, precisely due to this reason2. As Gneezy and List (2013) pointed out, “running [field]
2 From a private communication with Duncan Painter.
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experiments is a costly undertaking, but it is prohibitively costly not to experiment.”. In fact,
“many product and pricing failures can be laid at the feet of insufficient investigations and tests.”
Third, our methodology has stood the test of a real competitive business environment and
demonstrated tangible revenue improvements. Working closely with the industry partner to test
our methodology in the field, we are able to learn not only whether the proposed methodology
improves business decisions, but also, perhaps more importantly, the challenges and opportunities
that implementing a competition-based dynamic pricing policy can bring to an online retailer in a
real setting. Our work helps navigate and evaluate the trade-offs involved in bridging theoretical,
empirical, and field work.
Finally, our work presents a scalable and replicable methodology to set dynamic prices in an
online retail setting. In what follows, we present a detailed account of our methodology and the
results.
2. Empirical Setting
Our retail partner is a leading Chinese online retailer that originally focused on consumer packaged
goods but over time evolved to be a hypermarket. Founded in July 2008, it achieved sales of $1.9
billion in 2013, and was identified by a 2011 survey by Deloitte3 as one of the top 10 fastest growing
technology companies in the Asia-Pacific region, with a three year revenue growth of 19,218 percent.
In our study, we focus on one particular product category sold by this retailer: baby-feeding bottles.
Pricing decisions are present in every category the retailer offers. However, we decided to focus
our study on one particular category, allowing us to carefully consider all the different factors
affecting the pricing decision. In addition, since experimentation is an important component of our
research approach, we needed to find one category appropriate for this approach that the retailer is
willing to experiment with. The category resulting from these multiple requirements is baby-feeding
bottles.
This category presents a number of features that make it very attractive for our study. It includes
a group of relatively homogeneous products that can be characterized by a small number of well-
defined product attributes: country of origin, brand, bottle size, bottle shape and material, nipple
size, nipple shape and material, and price point. The fact that feeding bottles have well-defined
product characteristics makes it easier to identify competing or substitutable products, which plays
a key role in the pricing decision. In addition, although there are innovations and new product
launches in the baby-feeding bottle category, the life cycle of the products is long compared to the
time span that the product will be used. It is also the case that during the course of our analysis
there were no new product introductions or innovations. The baby-feeding-bottle category presents
3 Deloitte News Release: Top 10 Fastest Growing Technology Firms for 2011. December 1, 2011.
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a relatively small number of brands and manufacturers that do not engage in exclusivity deals
with retailers. This means all competing retailers can carry any product across different brands.
Finally, another relevant characteristic of this category is that most customers will not engage in
repeated purchases in a short period of time (e.g., daily or weekly) since the product will outlast the
baby’s need. Therefore, it is unlikely consumers will anchor prices based on their purchase histories.
Moreover, inter-temporal substitution is not a pressing concern, nor is stock-piling behavior, which
may be present for other categories, such as toilet paper and laundry detergent.
Although the characteristics of the baby-feeding-bottle category as described make it very appeal-
ing for our purposes, it is important to note these features are not unique to this category. There
are many other product categories that share similar characteristics and where our methodology
and analysis also apply, such as small appliances, hardware tools, and kitchenware, to name a few.
Hence, the methodology we introduce can be used to create a broadly applicable pricing tool for a
variety of product categories and retail settings.
3. Research Approach
Competition-based dynamic pricing is a recent development driven by the competitive nature of
online retailing. Conventionally, dynamic pricing has been applied mostly in settings with perishable
inventory and finite selling season (see for example Gallego and van Ryzin 1994, Levin et al. 2009
and Besbes and Zeevi 2009) in various industries including the air-travel (Boyd and Bilegan 2003),
hospitality (Goldman et al. 2002), fashion (Caro and Gallien 2012), electronics and software (Nair
2007) and advertisements (Ye et al. 2014). In our setting, however, the need for dynamic pricing rises
not from constrained capacity, but from rapidly-changing market condition due to competition.
This rapidly-changing market environment also poses new challenges and opportunities to retail
pricing. The long-standing literature of retail pricing focuses mostly on pricing and promotion
decisions for a single brick-and-mortar retailer holding competition prices constant (see for example
the literature on category management and retail pricing Basuroy et al. (2001)), or long-term
competitive pricing strategy (see for example Lal and Rao 1997). In traditional retail settings the
pressure for frequent competitive responses are less prevalent due to high physical search costs on
the customer’s side and high menu costs of changing prices on the retailer’s side. Our work also
expand the existing literature on this topic since these two factors are not present in our setting and
makes competition-based dynamic pricing a very relevant issue. Hereafter we outline our research
approach together with relevant literature.
Our research approach can be divided into three stages that utilize different methodologies,
including structural modeling and estimation, experimentation, and optimization. These stages are
closely connected in the sense that each stage provides necessary inputs to inform the next one.
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3.1. Consumer Choice Model
In the first stage, our objective is to define a consumer choice model, the estimation of which can
provide inputs to determine optimal responses to competitors’ price and availability variations.
Therefore, a critical feature of the model is to capture how consumers make choices among all
competing options, including products offered by our partnering retailer and its major competitors.
Both prices (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000) and availability (Musalem et al. 2010) of these products
are determinants of consumer choices. In particular, modeling and estimating the substitution
across retailers are essential to define the correct responses to competitors’ price and availability
changes, as we will illustrate in Section 4.
Our model follows the choice model framework pioneered by Guadagni and Little (1983) and later
applied extensively in marketing (e.g. Chintagunta 1993, Bell and Lattin 1998) and the operations
management literature (e.g. Ryzin and Mahajan 1999, Ko¨k and Xu 2011) with applications in
retailing. Discrete choice models have seen an increasing number of applications in many industries
using dynamic pricing, such as the airline (Vulcano et al. 2010, Newman et al. 2014) and hotel
industries (Roger et al. 2014).
The key challenge in our context, which distinguishes our approach from a standard choice
model, is the incomplete information of choice decisions we face. In particular, we do not observe
choices made on competitors’ products, a common challenge almost all retailers face. If we did
observe choices made on competitors’ products, it would be straightforward to apply a standard
multinomial logit model or some of its variations to estimate how consumers make choices among
all options, where each option is a retailer-product pair.
In the absence of competitors’ sales information, it is unclear how to identify consumers’ retailer
preferences and the extent to which consumers engage in price comparison across retailers. Both
components are key to identify substitution patterns. We propose an identification strategy that
exploits temporary variations in consumer choice sets through our own and competitor stock-outs,
which will be discussed in Section 4.3.
3.2. First Field Experiment: Test Price Elasticities
The goal of this stage is to obtain unbiased measures of price elasticity. Conducting a field exper-
iment where product prices are randomly determined allow us to avoid having endogenous prices
as in most observational studies.
Over the last few years there have been a number of field experiments in the economic literature
that started to study consumer response to price and other product attributes in different contexts.
For example, Karlan and Zinman (2009) look at these relationships in the context of direct mail
offers, Ashraf et al. (2007) study the impact of price variation in the context of door-to-door sales,
and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) study the impact of price variation in a child daycare setting.
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We are aware of two papers that study the impact of price variations in a retail setting Gaur
and Fisher (2005) and Johnson et al. (2014). These papers focuses on how demand varies with
prices for several products sold by the retailer. The key differences between our work and theirs
are the presence of competition, stock-outs and the fast-changing online environment, which calls
for dynamic responses.
It is also important to note that with the presence of competition, price randomization alone
will not necessarily guarantee unbiased estimation of elasticities unless competitors’ actions are
properly accounted for. Ignoring competitors’ reactions to our price changes would bias the esti-
mation because prices can still be correlated with unobserved demand shocks through correlation
with competitors’ prices. This is why we account for changes in competitors’ prices and product
availability in the consumer choice model.
3.3. Second Field Experiment: Test Best-Response Pricing Algorithm
Once we obtain our estimates for the choice model using data generated during the randomized price
experiment, we optimize response prices for the retail partner using a constrained optimization.
The objective is to maximize total category revenue while accounting for consumer choice behavior,
competition actions, and supply parameters (procurement cost, target margin, and manufacturer
price restrictions).
We conduct a second field experiment to evaluate our best-response pricing algorithm in a real
business setting. The collaboration with our retail partner allows us to measure the impact of our
proposed pricing model through a controlled live experiment. In order to evaluate the impact on
total category revenue, instead of matching products based on product features we assign prod-
ucts to treatment and control groups to minimize substitution across groups but meanwhile allow
substitution within each group. Note, however, such assignment of treatment and control groups
may violate the common parallel trend assumption that is required for the difference-in-differences
approach. To resolve this issue, we introduce another fold of comparison. In particular, we apply
our algorithm in only one geographical region where the retailer operates and choose two other
similar but disparate regions where the retailer also operates as comparison. This design leads to a
difference-in-differences-in-differences estimator, which allows us to correct for the potential differ-
ences in demand trends between the control and treatment groups with the presence of comparison
groups subject to similar but independent demand. In the experiment, we exert care in framing
and communicating the experiment to the pricing managers such that (1) price managers in other
regions are completely unaware of the ongoing experiment and (2) the experiment is not framed
as a test of an algorithm to replace current practice, but rather as a decision support tool.
The details of the implementation of this second field experiment, its results, and its implications
are discussed in Section 8.
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4. Consumer Choice Model
The key challenge to understand how consumers make choices among a set of substitutable products
from multiple competing retailers is the lack of competitors’ sales data. In this section, we first
present the general framework of our choice model, which describes how consumers make choices
among substitutable products offered by multiple competing retailers. Then we discuss a strategy
for estimating model parameters in the absence of competitors’ sales data.
4.1. Choice Model Framework
Facing a choice set of J products offered by R retailers, a consumer i obtains utility uijr from
purchasing product j at retailer r, where
uijr = αj +αr +βj log pjr + ijr, j = 1,2, ..., J, , r= 1,2, ...,R
ui0 = X0γ+ i0
A consumer will purchase product j from retailer r at price pjr if uijr =
maxjr,j=1,2,...,J,r=1,2,...,R{uijr, ui0}, and will choose the outside option if ui0 =
maxjr,j=1,2,...,J,r=1,2,...,R{uijr, ui0} otherwise. The intercept αj corresponds to the constant utility
obtained from purchasing product j regardless of which retailer the product is purchased from.
The intercept αr is the additional utility obtained by purchasing a product from retailer r, which
can be understood as a customer’s retailer preference. For instance, a consumer would assign a
higher utility to a retailer who offers more convenient online check out, a reliable delivery program,
or a lenient return policy. The higher the value of αr, the larger the premium a customer is willing
to pay to buy the product from retailer r. In this case, a customer will choose another retailer
only when the price gap is sufficiently large. Note that only the differences across these retailers’
preferences are identifiable. Hence, we normalize α1 = 0 for our retail partner. Product-specific
price sensitivity is captured by the parameter βj. We do not explicitly model shipping costs
because all retailers offer generous shipping policy in this context—free shipping for a small
minimum spending per order (RMB29 to RMB39)4 thanks to low labor costs in China. As a
result, almost all orders in our setting satisfy free shipping. In context where shipping costs vary
significantly across competitors and orders, one could include shipping cost sensitivity in the
model.
The outside option in our model includes purchasing from other channels including both online
and brick-and-mortar retailers and not purchasing at all. We allow the utility of the outside option
to vary across days of the week, holidays, and pre-holiday periods to capture the fact that purchase
intention, or conversion rate, could vary between weekdays and weekends or between holidays and
4 The exchange rate of RMB to US Dollars as of Aug 1, 2014 is 6.18 to 1.
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regular days (Perdikaki et al. 2012, Lu et al. 2013). These covariates are captured in the matrix
X0. One can either include X0 in the specification of the outside utility, or in the utility of each
product and normalize the mean of the outside utility as zero. The two are equivalent.
Finally, ijr represents consumer i’s utility shock of purchasing product j at retailer r. Distribu-
tion assumptions and correlation patterns of ijr will be discussed in the subsequent section.
The majority of prior studies involving consumer choice models restrict the attention to a model
where the parameter β is a constant that does not vary across products. In these models, the
estimates of price sensitivity are driven primarily by demand and price variations across all prod-
ucts. In our paper, however, we will conduct an experiment to introduce price variations within
each product, thereby allowing us to measure the extent to which price sensitivities vary across
products, and meanwhile addressing potential concerns of price endogeneity. The design of the
experiment is discussed in Section 5.
There are several arguments in the literature for why price sensitivity might vary by product.
First, there are many examples of price premiums charged for products with higher expected
quality. This suggests that either higher expected product quality reduces price sensitivity or that
less price-sensitive consumers are attached to higher quality products (Erdem et al. 2002). Second,
product uncertainty may affect price sensitivity. The direction of the effect can happen in both
ways. When consumers are uncertain about product quality, they may use price as a signal and thus
exhibit lower price sensitivity (Gaur and Fisher 2005). On the other hand, if consumers are risk
averse, they may derive greater disutility from a given price, thus inducing higher price sensitivity
for uncertain products (Tellis and Gaeth 1990). Lastly, availability of alternative choices may lead
to higher price sensitivity (Nelson 1974). Hence, products offered at more venues may exhibit
higher price sensitivity, and that popular products may exhibit higher price elasticity than niche
products.
An alternative to letting price elasticity vary by products is to specify a random coefficient
model, where the price coefficient β˜i is consumer specific and is a random draw from a distribution
whose parameters are to be estimated. The advantage of this model is that it explicitly incorporates
consumer heterogeneity. However, how price elasticity varies across products is dictated by product
specific intercepts (see Train 2009, Chapter 6, for details). In contrast, the model with product-
specific price elasticity allows for greater degrees of freedom and is more sensitive to demand and
price variations associated with each specific product—as we shall see in the estimation results
price elasticities vary significantly across products. Of course, achieving this requires greater price
variations within each product to retain the statistical power, thanks to our randomized price
experiment.
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An ambitious model may incorporate both consumer heterogeneity and product specificality at
the same time. However, such model requires estimating at least J random coefficient distributions
(both means and standard deviations), which suffers from over-fitting issues when applied to a
relatively short experimental data set.
4.2. Extent of Price Comparison
The utility shocks ijr are not completely independent of each other because the R options asso-
ciated with a particular product j are essentially the same product. Even though the purchasing
utility could vary depending on the retailer’s platform from which it is purchased, the consumption
utility associated with these products are the same. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that
a consumer who likes product j at retailer r should also like the same product offered by other
retailers. In other words, the utility shocks ijr for a product are correlated across retailers. To
allow such correlation, we assume the utility shocks i = {i0, ijr, j = 1,2, ..., J, r= 1,2, ...,R} have
a cumulative distribution given by:
exp
(
− e−i0−
J∑
j=1
( R∑
r=1
e−
ijr
1−λ
)1−λ)
Under such a joint distribution, the marginal distribution of each utility shock ijr follows an
univariate extreme value distribution. In other words, our model establishes a nested structure
where each product is a nest. The parameter λ can be intuitively understood as an indicator of
correlation for utility shocks for the same product offered by different retailers. As λ increases,
the correlation increases.5 A value of λ = 0 indicates no correlation, and the model reduces to a
standard multinomial logit model. As the value of λ approaches 1, utility shocks approach perfect
correlation, which means that all ijr associated with product j are identical across retailers. In this
case, every consumer will buy from the retailer that offers the lowest price (assuming for a moment
that retailer preferences αr are identical). In other words, λ can also be understood as a measure
of the extent to which customers engage in price comparison. The larger the λ, the more likely
prices will be the driving factor of retailer choice. The smaller the λ, the more likely the choice
of retailers will be proportional to their market share according to the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives property, which asserts that the ratio of probabilities of choosing two alternatives is
independent of the availability or attributes of a third option. For this reason, the larger the λ, the
more concerned retailers should be about monitoring and following competitors’ price movements.
Under this proposed model, the probability of purchasing product j from retailer r can be written
as follows:
Prjr =
exp
(αj+αr+βj log pjr
1−λ
)(∑R
s=1 exp
(αj+αs+βj log pjr
1−λ
))−λ
exp(X0γ) +
∑J
j=1
(∑R
s=1 exp
(αj+αs+βj log pjr
1−λ
))1−λ
5 λ is not exactly equal to the correlation, but it can be used as a proxy for it.
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4.3. Identification
The model discussed so far could be estimated using a standard nested logit framework if we were
able to observe competitors’ sales, which, unfortunately, we are not. We do observe the assortment
carried by competitors and their prices and availability. In what follows, we first illustrate the
identification issues with incomplete sales information. Then we show how own and competitor
stock-out occasions serve as a source of identification for retailer preferences and the extent of price
comparison.
For illustration, we use a simple case where there are only two products, 1 and 2, and two
competing retailers, A and B (normalize αA = 0). We also assume for now that all utility shocks are
independent, i.e., λ= 0. For simplicity, we remove the covariates matrix X0 and assume that the
mean utility of the outside option equals zero. Thus, the model reduces to a standard multinomial
logit model where:
ui1A = α1 +β1 log p1A + i1A
ui2A = α2 +β1 log p2A + i1A
ui1B = α1 +αB +β1 log p1B + i1A
ui2B = α2 +αB +β1 log p2B + i1A
ui0 = i0
Suppose we only observe retailer A’s sales data; given market size6 M and sales y1A, y2A, we can
infer the market share of product 1 at retailer A, s1A, and the market share of product 2 at retailer
A, s2A. Then the following two moment conditions hold:
s1A
s2A
=
exp(α1 +β1 log p1A)
exp(α2 +β2 log p2A)
(4.1)
s1A
1− s1A− s2A =
exp(α1 +β1 log p1A)
1 + exp(α1 +αB +β1 log p1B) + exp(α2 +αB +β2 log p2B)
(4.2)
By rewriting Equation 4.1, we have
log
(s1A
s2A
)
= α1−α2 +β1 log p1A−β2 log p2A (4.3)
6 We adopt two approaches to approximate market size similar to what is commonly done in the literature (see Berry
et al. 1995, for example). In the first approach, we assume market size is constant, and in the second approach market
size is allowed to vary by day. In the latter approach, we obtain a proxy for market size on each day by assuming that
it is proportional to category web traffic observed at our partnering retailer. The estimation results are not sensitive
to which approach we use.
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From Equation 4.3, we are able to identify three (sets of) parameters: α1 − α2, β1, β2. Recall
that we are able to identify price coefficients without bias because prices p1A, p2A are randomly
assigned in our experiment and, more importantly, assigned in a way that allows us to identify two
separate price sensitivities without encountering multi-collinearity among these two price series.
Otherwise, prices of similar products might suffer from multi-collinearity caused by common cost
shifters. Unfortunately, we could not separate the intercepts α1, α2 from this moment condition.
Since β1, β2 can be identified from Equation 4.3, we are left with three parameters, α1, α2, αB,
that need to be estimated and we have only two moment conditions given by Equations 4.1 and
4.2. We would need at least one more moment condition to fully identify all three parameters.
In what follows, we show how stock-outs would offer us this additional moment condition. Sup-
pose product 1 stocks out at Competitor B; we then have the following moment condition:
s′1A
1− s′1A− s′2A
=
exp(α1 +β1 log p1A)
1 + exp(α2 +αB +β2 log p2B)
(4.4)
We now have three moment conditions 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4, and exactly three parameters α1, α2, αB
to identify.
The greater the number of stock-outs, the greater the identification power. In fact, using a similar
logic, one could prove that price variations at competitors would also lend additional moment
conditions for identification. However, this identification strategy can lack power, especially if price
variations are low, either due to limited self price variations (for example, Product 2 in Figure 3) or
highly correlated prices across competitors (for example, Product 1 in Figure 3). The lack of power
arises because, besides availability, price is the only time-variant product feature that is present in
this context for identification (Newman et al. 2013). All the other product features such as size,
brand or shape are time invariant.
It is important to note that though prices and availability are both time-variant product features,
they help the identification strategy in different ways. While price variations affect only the utility
levels obtained from each option, availability variation alters the composition of the choice set by
changing what is available in the choice set. The latter generates sizable changes in the choices
available to consumers and this is very valuable, especially when market shares are small. Note
that on the other hand, price variations usually do not affect choices as significantly as availability
variations. In addition, the same source of variations needs to be used to identify a second set of
parameters: price elasticities.
To illustrate this point in a more concrete way, we conduct 3,600 simulations rounds. Each
round with 2000 purchases per day for a 30 days period to show why relying exclusively on price
variations can cause both biased and noisy estimates. The effect is particularly concerning when
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price variation is low or price correlation is high across competitors. The details of this simulation
are presented in Appendix A.
In a nutshell, stock-outs allow us to exploit temporal changes in the consumer choice set and
hence provide a useful source of variation for demand estimation, particularly in the context where
not all choice decisions are observed. Conlon and Mortimer (2013) also used stock-outs as an
identification strategy but with complete information on choice decisions. As we have shown in this
section, this source of variation is even more critical with only partially observed choice decisions.
This idea is similar to those who exploit long-term changes in market structures, such as entries
and exits, as a source of variation in consumer choice sets.
We now demonstrate how the extent of price comparison λ is identified. We again illustrate
the logic with an example employing two products and two retailers, but now utility shocks can
be correlated across retailers selling the same product and the correlation is parameterized by λ.
Consider the two cases, where, in the first case, all products are in stock at both retailers and, in
the second case, product 1 stocks out at Competitor B. We have four moment conditions:
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where Vjr = αj +αr+βj log pjr, j = 1,2, r=A,B. Again, the identification of βj, j = 1,2 comes from
the variation in prices pjA, j = 1,2.
These four moment conditions allow us to identify four parameters α1, α2, αB, λ. It is worthwhile
to understand the intuition of identification in addition to the mathematical derivation. The follow-
ing example illustrates the intuition behind our approach. We first explain how retailer preference
is identified.
Suppose there is only one product in the market and it is offered by two retailers: our retail
partner and a competitor. Consumers then have three options: buy from our retail partner, buy
from the competitor, or do not buy the product at all. On a given day, if the competitor stocks out,
the consumer’s choice set reduces to only two options: buy from our retail partner or do not buy.
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The difference between our partner’s sales volume on this day and another otherwise equivalent day
when the competitor does not stock-out will indicate consumer preference for retailers. Holding the
price constant, the larger the difference in sales, the larger the competitor’s share is on a regular
day and the more preferred the competitor is relative to us.
We now illustrate how the extent of price comparison is identified. Consider the case with two
products in the market carried by both retailers. When one product stocks out at the competitor,
customers now have four options: buy this particular product from our retail partner, buy the
other product from the competitor, buy the other product from us, and not buy at all. The extent
of sales increase of the same product at our retail partner is affected by consumer willingness to
shop across retailers for the same product, especially when there are other options available at
the competing retailer. Now suppose our retail partner stock outs instead of the competitor: the
magnitude of the sales increase of the other product at our retail partner (substitution within a
retailer), as compared to the sales increase described in the previous case (substitution within a
product), indicates to what extent consumers “stick” to the same retailer versus “stick” to the
same product when stock-outs happen.
To summarize, let zjr = 1 denote that product j is in stock at retailer r and 0 otherwise. We can
rewrite the probability of purchasing product j at retailer r:
Prjr =
zjr exp
(αj+αr+βj log pjr
1−λ
)(∑R
s=1 zjs exp
(αj+αs+βj log pjr
1−λ
))−λ
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j=1 zjr exp
(αj+αr+βj log pjr
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s=1 zjs exp
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In what follows, we discuss necessary conditions in which stock-outs can be considered as a valid
source of identification.
First, the identification depends on the exogeneity of stock-outs. If we observe correlation between
stock-outs of a product and the unobserved utility shock of this product, the exogeneity condition
would be violated. This would be the case, for example, if a product has been popular for some
time and as a result of this popularity it has sold out. If utility shocks are serially correlated, then
the utility shock of the product is likely to be high during the stock-out as well. We tested this
by examining the demand patterns of each product for autocorrelation and found no evidence of
such.7
7 Specifically, using Durbin-Watson statistics, we test for serial correlation for each product during the experiment
period and two months prior to the experiment periods. All Durbin-Watson statistics are above the commonly used
lower critical value 1, except for one at 0.984. 13 out of the 15 are within the range of 1.5 to 2.5, while 2 means zero
autocorrelation (the other two are 0.984 and 1.431). These results suggest serial correlation is not a strong concern.
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Second, it is possible that retailers adjust prices of other available items when they experience
stock-outs for some products. If the choice model explicitly accounts for competitors’ prices of all
major products, such correlation is not a threat to identification.
Third, in contexts where a non-negligible number of customers choose to wait when experiencing
a stock-out—for example, when the iPhone was first introduced— stock-outs can still be used as
an identification strategy but the model needs to explicitly account for the waiting decision. In the
current model, if a consumer experiences a stock-out at a retailer and decides to wait until the
product becomes available, the model will count the consumer as choosing the outside option and
treat the individual as a new customer when he or she comes back. In our setting, this is not a major
concern because the channels and products are not substantially differentiated, unlike iPhones for
example. This means it is unlikely that customers will wait to buy a product at a specific retailer
when the exact same product is available at a competing retailer with a comparable price.
5. Price Elasticity Field Experiment
As noted previously, a challenge that practitioners and academics encounter in identifying the
relationship between prices and demand data is the endogeneity generated by pricing decisions. This
endogeneity challenge holds when the estimation is done from observational data, where prices are
not randomly defined and managers make pricing decisions based on demand information observed
at that time. Unfortunately, in most situations, this information is not observable to researchers.
In the past, researchers have used instrumental variables to correct for this type of estimation
bias. The two most commonly used instruments in settings similar to ours are Hausman-style
instruments and lagged prices. Although theoretically appealing, these approaches can have signif-
icant limitations in practice. First, Hausman-style instruments use the average price of the same
product sold in other geographical markets as the instrument for the price in the focal market, as
those prices in different locations can be subject to common firm-level cost shifters but should not
be correlated with demand in the focal market (Hausman 1996, Nevo 2001). The effectiveness of
this approach depends on 1) whether the product is sold at multiple locations; and 2) sufficient
correlation between prices and common cost shifters (see Tereyagoglu et al. (2014) and Villas-
Boas and Winer (1999)). These assumptions may not be true in reality. For example, if product
assortment varies across locations, Hausman-style instruments may not be present for all products
under consideration. Another limitation can be present for those products whose prices change fre-
quently, daily or sometimes multiple times a day. For these products, considering cost parameters
as instruments can prove to be a very weak instrument since costs do not change nearly as fast as
prices8.
8 Coming soon: Toilet paper priced like airline tickets. The Wall Street Journal. September 5, 2012.
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Similarly, to consider lagged prices to be an effective instrument we need to observe sufficient
correlation between lagged and current prices, which often is the case. However, we also need
sufficient time-series variations in prices such that lagged and current prices are not highly collinear.
For those products whose prices hold relatively constant during the period of study (Product 2
in Figure 3, for example), lagged prices are almost always the same as current prices. Hence, the
validity of lagged prices as instruments is clearly challenged. Indeed, for these products with little
historical price variation, is difficult (if not impossible) to estimate product-level price elasticity,
regardless of what instruments are being considered.
In the next section, we will illustrate the limitation discussed above by comparing the results
from different instrumental variable approach with our experimental approach.
5.1. Field Experiment Design and Implementation
With the support of our retail partner, we implemented a randomized experiment to resolve the
endogeneity issue. The field experiment consists of randomly varying prices for the top 15 selling
products in the baby-feeding-bottle category during a four-week period. These 15 products repre-
sent 7 percent of all the products in the category and capture 54 percent of the unit sales and 55
percent of the revenue for the category during an average week before the test was implemented.
Table 1 presents different summary statistics for relevant factors of these 15 products before the
test implementation.
We focus on the 15 top sellers for two reasons. First, in order to estimate the impact of the
randomized test, we need to focus on products that have a daily sales rate large enough to allow
us to obtain statistically significant results. Second, this approach is aligned with our ultimate
goal of developing a robust methodology to simultaneously maximize total revenue for a group of
products. Hence, our attention focuses on the products within this category that have the largest
impact on the category revenue.
When estimating the price elasticity of each product, we are concerned about different drivers
that potentially can affect customers’ sensitivity to prices: the absolute price level and the relative
gap between the retailer’s price and competitors’ prices. The assumption is that price elasticity
depends on two main factors: absolute price variations and price variations with respect to the
competition. To deal with this situation, we implement the field test by randomly assigning the
products being tested to two different groups.
The first group (Group A) randomly changes prices with respect to a base-line price defined by
the product’s historical price at the retailer, while the second group (Group B) randomly changes
prices with respect to the competitors’ prices for that product. We focus on the top four competitors
that, together with our partner, capture more than 90 percent of the online retail market in China.
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Once a product is randomly assigned to one of the two groups (variation with respect to the
historical baseline or to the competition price), we randomly assign the treatment level for each of
the products, depending on the group to which the product belongs.
We define five different treatment levels: high (+10 percent), medium-high (+5 percent), medium
(no variation), medium-low (-5 percent), and low(-10 percent). High and low are defined for each
product based on their assigned group. For example, if a product belongs to Group A and is
randomly assigned “medium-low” treatment, the product price is set 5 percent below the average
price for that product over the last eight weeks prior to the beginning of the test; if a product
belongs to Group B and is randomly assigned “high” treatment, the product’s price is set 10
percent above the lowest competitor’s price for that product during that day.
Before running the experiment we simulate outcomes we could obtained from a field test based
on assumed parameters. The tradeoff between exploration and exploitation was a big part of our
conversations when working on part of the project both internally within the research team and
when interacting with our retail partner (for a detail discussion on the exploration and exploitation
issues see Saure´ and Zeevi (2013), Keskin and Zeevi (2013) and Keskin and Zeevi (2014)). We
estimated, to the best of our knowledge, what were minimum bounds in terms of variation and
duration of the test that we needed for the field test to be effective. With these numbers in mind
we talk to the company. We wanted to ensure them that we were not asking for unnecessary efforts
on their end. Another issue that was part of the consideration at this stage was that the company
needed to keep all other factors constant during the testing period (for example, no promotions on
the tested products or a guarantee about the in stock levels).
The random assignment of treatment was designed using a fractional factorial design (see Mead
et al. (2012) for a reference), taking into account the five different treatment levels . The treatment
assigned to a product remained constant during a three-day period. Note that in the case of a
product in Group B, the treatment is constant but the actual price could vary during the three-day
period because competitors may change their prices. We choose to maintain the treatment during
a three-day period to avoid the risk of alerting customers that a test is in place and to minimize
the chance of customers’ speculative behaviors. Figure 1 shows the random assignments for each
of the products during the first two weeks of the experiment.
Each day at 9:00 a.m. local time during the four weeks of the test, we monitor competitor prices
and adjust our own prices according to the randomized schedule. Additionally, we monitor compet-
itive responses by scraping prices and product availability information from competitors’ websites
12 hours after our retail partner changed prices on each day. In particular, product availability
information are obtained by visiting product detail pages at competitors’ websites. When a product
is out of stock, consumer will still be able to find the product from a retailer’s website but will see
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a label of “Out of Stock” or “Add to Wishlist” on the search result page and on the product detail
page.
5.2. Field Test Analysis and Results
The test lasted for a total of 30 consecutive days and the implementation occurred according to
the plan. The key metrics tracked during the experiment include product prices, total sales, and
prices and product availability at four main competitors.
Figure 3 presents a comparison between units sold and retail prices for two products included
in our sample for the period before and after the test was implemented. It is interesting to observe
that, while it is very hard to see any pattern between price and demand from observational data
(graphs at the top of the figure), when random treatments are introduced, the price elasticity
becomes evident by visual inspection (graphs at the bottom of the figure).
In addition to dealing with the endogeneity issue, the field test allows us to introduce price
variation on a number of products that historically present a very stable price patter (Product 2 in
Figure 3). It is evident that if prices do not vary, it is almost impossible to estimate their impact
on demand.
Of course, beyond the impact we can observe from Figure 3, we want to take full advantage of
the randomized experiment. To do this, in the next section we estimate a customer choice model
using the identification strategy previously described to obtain price elasticities. We then calculate
optimal prices that account for, among other controls, the unbiased price elasticities as well as
prices and product availability of the competition.
6. Estimation Results
We compare estimation results obtained from different types of data, observational vs. experimen-
tal, and different types of models, with and without competition and price comparison, in Table
2. Column 1 represents the estimation results applying a standard multinomial logit model on
historical sales and price data without accounting for competition price and product availability.
Column 2 applies the same model to the data generated from randomized price experiment. Col-
umn 3 includes competition price and product availability in the model, while Column 4 further
incorporates consumer extent of price comparison across retailers.
6.1. Historical Data vs. Randomized Price Experiment
We first want to study how effective the randomized experiment is in addressing the price endogene-
ity issue. To do this we apply a standard multinomial logit model, to the historical data, with and
without instruments (Column 1 to 4 in Table 2). We also apply the same model to the experiment
data without using any instruments (Column 5 in Table 2). When applying the model to the his-
torical data, we use three instrumental variables that are commonly used in the literature, 1) costs
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(including wholesale costs and operating costs), 2) Hausman style instruments, i.e., average prices
in other geographically disparate locations (Hausman (1996)), and 3) lagged prices (Tereyagoglu
et al. (2014) and Villas-Boas and Winer (1999)). Note that these models only accounts for prices
and availability of substitutable products at our partner retailer but does not include competition
information yet.
As noted before, managers may adjust prices based on demand signals unobservable to us and
this may cause an upward bias in price elasticity estimates. This is evident in Table 2; the elasticities
of 5 of the 15 products turn out to be positive when simply applying a multinomial logit model
to historical data—without accounting for potential price endogeneity (Column 1). Even though
positive price elasticity can be found for conspicuous consumption, it certainly is not the case for
the product category under study (baby-feeding bottles).
The power of this instrumental variable approach critically depends on 1) the availability of
a valid instrument; and 2) whether the instrument itself captures sufficient variations from the
original variable to avoid insignificant estimates arising from weak instruments. See Wooldridge
(2010) for a detail discussion on the use of instrumental variables and the challenges that arise
when using weak instruments. There is also a rich literature that discusses other challenges that
can arise when dealing with instrumental variables approach, in particular when some of these
instruments are weak (Bekker (1994), Donald and Newey (2001), Chao and Swanson (2005)). In
our context, we find that the performance of instruments commonly used in the literature (such as
the three included in our new analysis) suffer from the limitations highlighted in the literature.
First, product cost is not a good instrument in our setting since six out of the fifteen elasticities
turned out to be positive and all estimates are noisier (as shown by large standard errors) than
those in our base analysis (Column 1) where we do not use any instrument. This is because product
costs do not change nearly as fast as prices in this context and for this reason turns out to be a
weak instrument. The second limitation is driven by the fact that some SKUs are offered only at
one location. Therefore, Hausman style instruments are not always available and when available
they correct the signs of only three positive estimates in Column 1. Lastly, the results obtained
when using lagged prices as instruments are almost identical to the results from using the original
prices. This is driven by the high correlation between prices and lagged prices.
We now turn to the results based on the randomized price experiments presented in Column 5. We
note that 13 out of the 15 price elasticities are negative, and 10 out of the 15 products present a lower
price elasticity compared to the one obtained when using historical data. It is worthwhile noting
that this is achieved with only half of the sample size (30 days vs. 67 days). This analysis suggests
that with the randomized experiment we are able to correct, to a certain extent, the positive biases
caused by price endogeneity. In additon, the results not only show improvement over the historical
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data without instruments but also over historical data with commonly used instruments (costs,
prices in other locations and lagged prices).9 As expected, the price elasticities obtained vary across
products. The range of the estimated elasticities can be driven by different product characteristics
such us: average price point, brand, competition intensity, etc. We actually observe one positive
estimate of price elasticity; these can be caused by not accounting for competitive actions, limited
size of price variations, or low purchase incidence during the period of study.
6.2. With vs. Without Competitor Information
We next focus our attention on how our proposed method, which accounts for competitor prices
and availability (Column 3), performs relative to the standard multinomial logit model (Column
2). It is important to emphasize that in our setting, price randomization per se is no guarantee for
exogeneity. This is because if competitors respond by adjusting their prices based on the randomized
prices, not accounting for competitors’ actions would introduce correlation between our prices and
the unobserved demand shocks through correlation with competitor prices. If competitor prices
and our prices are positively correlated, then there will be a positive bias in the estimation of price
sensitivities, βj, unless we account for competitors’ prices appropriately. To illustrate this, suppose
competitors follow our prices closely and decrease their prices as we decrease our prices, then we
will receive a lower demand shock. This generates a positive correlation between our price and our
demand, and hence biases price elasticity estimates upward.
To evaluate this concern we check whether it is the case that, during the period of our experiment,
the competitors react to our randomized changes by changing prices accordingly. Table 3 shows
the frequencies of competitor price responses within 12 and 24 hours after our price change. As we
can see from the table, competitors do not seem to follow closely our random price changes. The
most representative competitor, Competitor 2, followed only 11 of our 91 price increases and 9 of
our 75 price decreases. This pattern is consistent with that in the pre-test period, suggesting that
competitors are not aware prices changes are driven by a temporary test and act differently.
This result also indicates that during the one-month test period, the experiment successfully
introduced random variations not only in our own price levels but also in the relative price levels
with respect to the competitors. Consequently, the estimates we obtain from the full-choice model,
shown in Column 3, are close to estimates we presented in Column 2. It is relevant to point out
that although the elasticity estimates are similar to that obtained using the standard multinomial
logit approach, using our full-choice model we observe a significant improvement in the model fit:
the R-square increased from 0.5848 to 0.7107, a 21.5 percent increase.
9 Note that pseudo R-square and Log Likelihood are not comparable across these two columns as the model is applied
to different data sets.
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6.3. Extent of Price Comparison
Finally, we compare the last two columns in Table 2. Column 4 introduces an additional parameter,
λ, that captures the extent to which consumers conduct price comparison. Recall that λ= 0 means
utility shocks for the same products across retailers are independent, in which case Columns 3
and 4 should be the same. The larger the value of λ, the higher the correlation of utility shocks
for the same product across retailers and the more intense the price comparison is. The estimate
of λ equals 0.7911, which suggests a non-negligible correlation in utility shocks.10 In other words,
consumers engage in extensive price comparisons across competitors. The high intensity of price
comparison indicates that retailers need to follow competitors’ price adjustments closely to stay
competitive in the market. The impact of either overpricing or underpricing can be significant. In
fact, despite the small difference in overall model fit, models (3) and (4) will suggest very different
responses when competitors change prices, as will be elaborated in the subsequent section.
We now turn our attention to the estimated of competitor significance, i.e., αr. Our retail partner
is the baseline. Competitor 1 admits the highest preference followed by Competitor 2, our retail
partner, and Competitors 3 and 4 respectively. This is consistent with management knowledge of
the market.11 Except for Competitor 2, all estimates are statistically significant (as compared to
the baseline).12 All these retailers sell directly to customers. We do not account for prices charged
by small individual sellers who sell through online platforms, because no single individual seller
sells enough to be considered a major competitor and they either do not engage in dynamic pricing
or are merely price followers.
Figure 4 shows the goodness of fit graphically. It plots the predicted daily sales (in green) against
observed daily sales (in blue) based on our estimation results in Column 4. The average daily Mean
Absolute Deviation (MAD) is 0.377. Note there is a negative correlation of -0.697 (sig= 0.0041)
between model goodness of fit by product, as measured by MAD, with average daily sales, as shown
in Figure 5. In other words, the model better predicts demand for fast-moving products than for
slow-moving products.
10 Based on numerical results from Koppelman and Wen (2000), a 0.79 similarity score implies a correlation of 0.91
to 0.95.
11 The estimated market shares of our retail partner, Competitor 1, Competitor 2, Competitor 3, and Competitor 4 in
online B2C market in 2013 are: 1.52%, 14.0%, 2.34%, 1.2%, and 3.39%, respectively. Source omitted to protect identity
of competitors. Competitor 1 is commonly perceived as the market leader in many categories, while competitor 4
mostly specialize in home appliances and consumer electronics.
12 The percentages of stockouts for our retail partner and the four competitors during the experiment period are: 3.8%,
2.2%, 0%, 0%, 17.9%. Besides stockout, as we stated in the identification section, competitor price variations also lend
additional moment conditions for identification, in particular when our retail partner’s price and competitors’ prices
are not highly correlated thanks to our randomized experiment. The within-product price variation for our retail
partner and the four competitors are: 4.99, 3.88, 1.97, 11.94, and 15.36 RMB. For competitor 3, even though it did
not experience stockout, it has significant within-product price variation to facilitate identification. For competitor
2, it is very likely that it is indeed close to our retail partner given that the point estimate is very close to zero and
not statistically significant.
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Based on estimated model parameters, we calculate own and cross-price elasticities as shown in
Table 4. Note that cross-price elasticity differs by product due to differences in price sensitivities
measured by βj. Also note that our demand is most sensitive to prices of Competitor 1 and 2’s but
not to prices of Competitors 3 and 4. This is because Competitors 3 and 4 are relatively small players
in this category, as revealed by the estimated retailer preference αr. However, retailer preference
αr alone does not explain the difference in cross-price elasticity across retailers completely. Note
that sometimes our demand is more sensitive to prices of Competitor 2 than those of Competitor
1, even though Competitor 2 is less referred than Competitor 1 (α2 <α1). This is because for those
products, Competitor 2 actually charges a lower price than 1 and thus increases its competitiveness
in the market. In sum, which competitors to follow closely not only depends on the average retailer
preference but also competitors’ actual price levels.
We also note that estimated price elasticities indeed vary across products. Given that we only
have 15 SKUs, we cannot run regressions based on 15 data points to obtain statistically signifi-
cant results due to small sample. However, we make the following interesting observation on the
difference of price elasticities of domestic and imported brands. Among the 15 SKUs, we have
five different brands: Pigeon (4 SKUs, domestic), Love (1 SKU, domestic), NUK (6 SKUs, origin
Germany), Avent (3 SKUs, origin UK), Brown(1 SKU, origin US). We found that three SKUs
with most elastic demand are all domestic products (all Pigeon, price levels 84, 84, and 36 RMB).
We also note that the three SKUs with least elastic demand are all imported brands (2 NUK
and 1 Avent with price levels at 90, 76, 44 RMB). That is, consumers are less elastic to imported
brands than domestic brands, given similar price ranges. There can be several possible explanations.
Imported brands are typically perceived with high quality in China (Ozer et al. 2014), particularly
for baby-and-mom products given the recent scandals of tainted infant milk in China.13 The obser-
vation of lower elasticity to prices of imported brands can therefore be explained by the fact that
higher expected product quality reduces price sensitivity or than less price-sensitive consumers are
attached to high quality products such as imported brands (Erdem et al. 2002). It may also be
explained by the fact that there are more channels selling domestic brands than imported brands
which are typically distributed only through online channels.14 Products offered at more venues
exhibit higher price elasticity (Nelson 1974).
In the next section we use the estimates obtained from the choice model presented in Column 4
of Table 2 to determine the best response prices for each product.
13 Food Safety Is Crucial in China Deal for Baby Milk. The New York Times. August 27, 2014.
14 According to Nielson China eCommerce Report in September 2013, imported feeding bottle brands are mostly
distributed online rather than offline. For example, among the top for brands Pigeon, Brown, NUK, Avent by online
sales, the only brand that made the top 10 list by offline sales is the domestic brand Pigeon.
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7. Best-Response Pricing
Based on the estimates obtained from the choice model and taking into account competitor prices
and product availability, we find prices for our partner retailer that maximize total revenue for the
category subject to several constraints imposed by the retailer. The constraints include a lower
bound on average category margin, lower and upper bounds on individual product margins, and
manufacturer price restrictions. Changes in recommended prices come from four different sources:
(1) changes in costs, (2) changes in our own product availability, (3) changes in competitor prices,
and (4) changes in competitor product availability.
max
p1,p2,...,pJ
J∑
j=1
pjsj(pj, zj;p−j, z−j;pc,zc;α,β, γ,λ)
s.t.
∑J
j=1(pj − cj)sj(pj, zj;p−j, z−j;pc,zc;α,β, γ,λ)∑J
j=1 pjsj(pj, zj;p−j, z−j;pc,zc;α,β, γ,λ)
≥margin target
margin LBj ≤
prj − crj
prj
≤margin UBj,∀j
LBj ≤ pj ≤UBj,∀j
where sj(pj, zj;p−j, z−j;pjr, zjr, j = 1, ..., J, r= 2, ...,R;α,β, γ,λ) denote the market share of prod-
uct j at our retail partner, as a function of its own price and availability pj, zj, prices and availability
of the other substitutable products at our retail partner p−j, z−j, and prices and availability of all
products at competitors pc,zc;, and all parameters we have just estimated α,β, γ,λ. The market
share can be calculated using Equation 4.5.
Hanson and Martin (1996) show that logit profit functions are not concave in prices. One can
easily show that our constrained optimization problem is also non-concave in prices. Therefore, in
order to find the optimal solution, we seed 10 different initial values using the Matlab optimization
procedure for constrained optimization and choose the one that yields the best expected revenue.
The optimization procedure used to choose the optimal prices for a given day takes approximately
30 seconds.
We now consider the importance of considering correlated demand shocks within a product nest
across retailers, in other words, the degree to which consumers compare prices across retailers.
Table 5 shows how the two models, with independent and correlated demand shocks across retailers,
lead to different responses when competitors change prices.
With independent demand shocks, prices are primarily driven by costs and price elasticities that
are product specific. When competitors change prices, lost demand will be allocated to all available
alternatives—this means all products at all retailers—proportionally based on their current market
shares. Since there is a large number of options, the spill-over effect to the same product at a
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different retailer is very small and for this reason the suggested price change is very small in size
(e.g., when competitors’ prices change by 10 RMB, we only change the price of the same product
by 1 RMB as shown in Column 4 and Column 5 in Table 5).
Substitution patterns are the key to responsive pricing. On one extreme, if customers do not
substitute across retailers, there is no need to follow competitors’ prices; on the other extreme, if
customers always compare prices, one should almost always follow competitors’ price changes. From
our model’s estimation, consumers exhibit a strong price comparison behavior (λ= 0.7911). This
explains why under such a model, prices are more responsive to competitor price changes, as shown
in Column 5 and 6 in Table 5; our suggested prices change by a similar order of magnitude when
competitors change their prices (e.g., when competitor prices change by 10 RMB the estimated
prices change by 4 RMB to 6 RMB). We do not match fully the price change of 10 RMB because
we already price lower than competitor prior to this change.15
In sum, a model that fails to capture the extent to which consumers compare prices across
retailers will lead to insufficient response to competitor price changes. This will be true even when
we are able to capture price elasticities without bias with a randomized price experiment.
In order to gauge the potential revenue impact of our proposed best-response pricing strategy,
we conducted an out-of-sample test on the historical data—the same period which we used to
compare the estimation results in Table 2. We find that, had the retailer used this best-response
pricing algorithm instead to adjust prices in response to price changes in the market, they would
have obtained 7 percent higher category revenue while holding gross margin on a par with the
existing practice through the margin constraint.
8. Testing Best-Response Pricing with a Controlled Experiment
We tested the performance of our best-response pricing algorithm with a field experiment at our
partner retailer, in which prices are changed daily according to the outcome of our model.
8.1. Experiment Design
Note that the objective of our pricing algorithm is to maximize revenue for the category. Price
changes of a specific product will lead to not only revenue changes for that particular product but
also other products with similar features due to substitution. For this reason, a valid experiment
design requires minimal substitution between treatment and control groups, otherwise the control
group will be contaminated due to the spillover effect. Instead of matching products on their main
15 We also note that under the model with independent demand shocks, the price correlation between our retail
partner and the four competitors are: 0.519, 0.312, 0.346, 0.337, respectively. While with correlated demand shocks,
the price correlations are: 0.960, 0.405, 0.589, 0.373. This indicates that with correlated demand shocks, competitors
prices are more correlated.
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attributes, we identify that one existing attribute that allows a clean separation of the market
segments: bottles designed for certain ranges of babies’ ages. Each feeding bottle is designed for a
specific age group because babies of different months require different nipple sizes, nipple shapes,
and bottle volume. There is hardly any substitution between feeding bottles that are designed
for different age groups. Within our 15 feeding bottles, we identify 9 bottles that are designed
specifically for babies ranging from zero months to six months old, and the remaining 6 bottles are
designed for babies of seven months old and above.
Although we believe it is very unlikely that the pricing algorithm could work for one group of
bottles and not for the other, to ensure that the difference between the two age groups does not
drive the result of our pricing algorithm, we rotate the implementation of the treatment between
these two groups. Table 6 shows the design of the experiment, which lasts for a total of five weeks.
Note that in the last week, we let the experiment return to a state where neither of the two groups
receives treatment to further confirm that we are not capturing an overall time-trend effect.
8.2. Experiment Implementation
Our retail partner operates in multiple regions of the country. These regions are geographically
separated, 800 to 1,000 miles apart. Each region has its own warehouse, logistics team, and manage-
ment personnel. The population within each region is very dense; thus, the demand is sufficiently
large to allow for a dedicated shipping model in which a warehouse ships to only customers within
its own region but not across regions. This means each region can be viewed as a separate market
since there is no demand or supply substitution across these markets. The retailer’s website requires
customers to choose their locations before being able to browse any content. Once a customer
places an order, his shipping address will be verified again to avoid any cross-selling or overlap
between transactions across regions. This is a common practice among all major retailers in the
country.
This modus operandi gives us an advantage in our estimation approach since we are able to
introduce an additional comparison group. We implement the pricing algorithm in only one of
the regions, Region A, leaving the other regions as controls. We match Region A with the other
regions in the country by looking at online shopping traffic, sales volume, demographics (population
density and income distribution), and, in particular, margin rates, one of the key constraints of
our optimization procedure. After the process, we identify two Regions, B and C, as matches to
Region A.
To ensure the validity of Region B and C as controls, we make sure none of their pricing managers
or product managers are aware of the concurrent experiment conducted in Region A. In Region A,
where the experiment is implemented, it is not feasible to keep managers entirely unaware of the
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experiment because we need their cooperation to be able to adjust prices. However, we exercise
extra care not to alter pricing managers regular decisions so that controls in Table 6 are valid
controls. To do this we communicate to the managers that they should make pricing decisions as
they normally do. Specifically, instead of framing the experiment as a test of a potentially superior
pricing algorithm (i.e., a pilot or an implementation), we communicate to the team that the test is
a new randomized pricing experiment. Furthermore, when a group of products receives treatment,
we ask a designated person to update the product prices instead of sending the recommended prices
to the pricing team in an effort to avoid biasing in their decisions.
8.3. Triple-Differences Estimator
The experiment treatment we describe allows us to adopt a triple-differences estimator to measure
the impact of the proposed pricing methodology. The triple differences come from comparisons of
the periods before and after, Regions A, B and C, and the treatment and control age groups.
This triple-differences estimator is also called in the literature “difference-in-differences-in-
differences” (DDD) estimator. The key distinction of this estimator from the more commonly used
difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator is the presence of a third comparison group.
The critical identifying assumption underlying the DiD estimator is the existence of a parallel
trend. That is, the two groups would otherwise follow the same trend in the absence of treatment.
In our context particularly, because the control and treatment groups are not similar products
matched according to product attributes but rather dissimilar products, it is more likely that the
parallel trend assumption may not hold.
It is possible that in a short period of time, the demand for the two groups of products actually
follows different trends due to reasons such as seasonality of births. Indeed, we find evidence from
data prior to the experiment that products in Group 1 exhibit a slight upward trend in demand,
while products in Group 2 exhibit a slight downward trend in demand, and these trends exist across
all regions. However, the existence of a different region, which exhibits the same distinct trends
in the two groups, allows us to tease out the nonparallel trends between treatment and control
groups.
If the null hypothesis is that without treatment, the ratio of Group 1 revenue (or Group 2
revenue) at Region A over Group 1 revenue (or Group 2 revenue) at Region B is constant, then
we could use the following regression to examine the effect of treatment, where the treatment
alternates between Groups 1 and 2.
ln(Revgdm) = α0 +α1Week Dummygdm +α2Group1gdm +α3Treatmentgdm+
α4Region Dummygdm +α5Day of Weekgdm +α6Margingdm +α7Trafficgdm+
α8Region×Margingdm +α9Regiongdm×Trafficgdm + εgdm
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where subscript g denotes group, d denotes date, and m denote geographical region. For instance,
RevgdA denotes group g’s revenue on day d at Region A. Treatmentgd = 1 for Group 1 in weeks
1 and 3 and Group 2 in weeks 2 and 3 in Region A, otherwise it equals zero. The coefficient of
interest is α3, which can be interpreted as the percentage of revenue changes due to the treatment.
Table 7 shows that the revenue increases for the treated category vary from 10.9 percent to 12.4
percent depending on control variables included in the regression.
To summarize, we are capable of growing revenue because 1) we measure price elasticity accu-
rately, which allows us to charge a category revenue-maximizing margin for each product; and 2)
we measure cross-price elasticity accurately which allows, us to respond to competition only when
necessary, instead of attempting to always match all competitors’ price changes.16
9. Conclusion
To charge the right price, one first needs to obtain an unbiased measure of price elasticity. This
often is challenging when relying simply on historical sales and price data because prices are very
likely to be correlated with unobserved demand shocks that are accessible to pricing managers
but not to researchers. In a setting where prices change rapidly, such as online retailing, the task
becomes even more difficult because the commonly used instruments, i.e., cost shifters, do not
change as fast. Not surprisingly, we show that a randomized price experiment is an effective way
to address this concern. However, since it is costly to run field experiments, it is crucial to design
the experiment in such a way that it will induce a sufficient amount of random variations in both
absolute and relative terms (relative to competitors prices) within a reasonable price range and
time frame.
Accurate measure of price elasticity alone is not sufficient for price prescriptions, particularly in a
dynamic competitive setting. Levels of price elasticity only suggest which products to charge higher
or lower margins; however, it does not provide a complete answer on how to respond to competitor
price changes. Accurate response to competitor price changes depends most critically on consumer
engagement in price comparison across retailers. Moreover, responses should be differentiated based
on the significance of the competitor in the marketplace: is it a large or a small player?
While competitor’ price and product availability data can be obtained by monitoring competitor
websites, the absence of competitor sales information poses a significant challenge to estimate a
full consumer-choice model. We show that own and competitor stock-outs can be used as a valid
identification strategy to achieve this objective because they provide a temporary variation to
consumer choice set.
16 This revenue improvement is not unique to baby feeding bottles. We are currently expanding the implementation
of the algorithm to kitchenware and small appliances. Based on our preliminary analysis of kettles, we obtained 19
percent revenue improvement in this category.
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We want to emphasize that field studies present a set of challenges different from those arise either
in conducting laboratory experiments or from relying on observational data. Field studies involve
generating desired data in a way that minimizes interference from other parallel business activities
with compatible or competing interests that could contaminate the result of the experiment ex-
post. For instance, framing the experiment and communicating it to stakeholders are particularly
important for the validity of the control group.
Based on estimates of the proposed consumer choice model, we show that a best-response pricing
algorithm that takes into account consumer behavior, competitor actions, and supply parameters
demonstrates significant revenue improvement—11 percent for the product category under study.
Such improvement is not specific to this one category in particular. We conducted the same test
in kitchenware products and found similar revenue improvement of 19 percent.
Finally, with ever-expanding product spaces and entries and exits of competitors, market condi-
tions change rapidly for online retailers. Hence, we suggest retailers test demand responses period-
ically to keep up with the evolving market and implement an effective dynamic pricing strategy.
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Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1 Summary Statistics for the 15 Products in the Field Test
PRODUCT DAILY SALES PRICE MARKET PRICE
# Average Max. Min. SD Average Max. Min. SD Average
1 29.0 63.0 0.0 14.5 35.6 40.4 33.9 1.5 40.5
2 15.2 33.0 0.0 8.6 32.2 35.9 31.9 0.7 35.1
3 2.9 15.0 0.0 2.8 40.6 45.0 37.5 2.6 48.6
4 1.8 6.0 0.0 1.4 44.9 48.0 40.0 1.5 48.7
5 3.5 12.0 0.0 2.2 89.0 109.8 80.0 3.9 91.3
6 4.3 13.0 0.0 3.4 88.3 102.0 84.0 2.9 91.2
7 4.3 18.0 0.0 3.6 76.1 82.0 74.3 0.9 79.2
8 2.2 8.0 0.0 2.1 66.2 84.0 61.2 6.6 81.2
9 9.6 27.0 0.0 7.7 91.7 99.0 82.4 6.5 92.8
10 3.7 9.0 0.0 2.5 14.4 16.7 13.9 0.6 20.9
11 17.8 36.0 0.0 7.2 84.9 108.0 78.9 6.3 100.0
12 22.5 65.0 0.0 18.4 86.0 175.0 83.2 11.9 83.9
13 18.2 58.0 0.0 15.4 85.5 109.0 84.0 5.4 84.0
14 3.9 18.0 0.0 4.3 121.5 134.0 107.0 10.2 121.0
15 2.3 27.0 0.0 5.5 130.7 145.7 118.5 11.7 111.0
These summary statistics correspond to the two-month period right before
the field test was implemented.
Figure 1 First Two Weeks of Random Treatment Assignment
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Figure 2 Example of Test Implementation Results — Price-Sales Relationship
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Figure 3 Example of Test Implementation Results — Price-Market Price Relationship
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Table 2 Estimates of Product Elasticities for Feeding Bottle SKUs
Historical Data Randomized Price Experiment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No Comp Info No Comp Info No Comp Info No Comp Info No Comp Info w/ Comp Info w/ Comp Info
IV IV IV Ind. Demand Corr. Demand
Cost Hausman Lagged Price Shocks Schocks
Product Specific Price Elasticity (βj)
Product 1 0.974 -4.969 0.060 0.755 -5.496*** -5.438*** -1.675***
(0.624) (5.259) (0.704) (0.664) (0.939) (0.234) (0.157)
Product 2 -2.451*** -10.453 2.328 -2.288*** -2.390** -2.267** -0.367***
(0.519) (6.639) (2.157) (0.549) (1.129) (1.004) (0.014)
Product 3 -5.436*** 7.190 -5.200** -8.066*** -7.109*** -4.572*** -6.773***
(1.043) (13.222) (2.561) (1.399) (1.715) (0.636) (0.643)
Product 4 -4.398** -5.068 -1.511 -2.648 2.280 -0.006 -0.004
(1.8216) (5.0866) (6.7204) (2.1419) (2.0565) (0.025) (0.001)
Product 5 -1.848** -0.525 -3.193 -1.161 0.096 -0.004*** -0.953***
(0.906) (5.678) (2.381) (1.228) (2.468) (0.003) (0.103)
Product 6 -1.410 -10.999 -1.779 -0.796 -4.028* -2.367*** -1.054
(1.213) (10.129) (2.797) (1.261) (2.332) (0.523) (0.727)
Product 7 -0.214 2.076 -3.764 -0.252 -1.534 -2.399*** -0.540
(0.649) (9.952) (2.666) (0.714) (1.415) (0.472) (0.340)
Product 8 3.709 10.121*** N/A 5.768** -4.222*** -2.964*** -1.164**
(2.422) (2.467) N/A (2.402) (1.406) (0.336) (0.535)
Product 9 -3.713*** -11.545*** -5.500*** -3.587*** -4.450*** -4.296*** -1.118***
(0.699) (2.020) (1.269) (0.712) (0.872) (0.293) (0.159)
Product 10 2.244 -0.684 -0.363 3.001* -4.400 -4.845*** -4.149***
(1.506) (10.976) (2.475) (1.640) (3.381) (0.551) (1.343)
Product 11 -8.225*** -9.944*** -7.994*** -8.279*** -4.324*** -4.058*** -0.504***
(0.810) (1.090) (0.817) (0.846) (0.959) (1.872) (0.093)
Product 12 1.487** 2.151 -4.919*** -0.795 -17.149*** -3.049*** -2.187***
(0.654) (5.002) (1.606) (0.611) (5.917) (0.077) (0.045)
Product 13 0.812 -21.701*** -26.739*** 1.505 -26.061*** -4.515*** -11.281***
(1.252) (7.294) (5.726) (1.435) (3.075) (0.284) (0.518)
Product 14 -3.632*** 7.548 N/A -3.438*** -2.110* -2.525*** -0.922***
(0.546) (13.609) N/A (0.519) (1.151) (0.209) (0.167)
Product 15 -2.914*** 10.459 N/A -2.821*** -3.460*** -3.848*** -1.142***
(0.759) (16.980) N/A (0.703) (0.709) (0.197) (0.151)
Retailer Preferences
Retail Partner baseline baseline
Competitor 1 0.260 0.217**
(3.163) (0.096)
Competitor 2 0.366 0.017
(4.225) (0.119)
Competitor 3 -3.750 -1.836***
(10.683) (0.045)
Competitor 4 -3.887*** -2.464***
(1.457) (0.010)
Extent of Price Comparison (λ) 0.7911***
(0.0203)
Product Intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day-of-Week & Holiday Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Days 67 67 67 67 30 30 30
# Purchases 7690 7690 7298 7580 3742 3742 3742
Pseudo R2 0.6696 0.6671 0.6749 0.6668 0.5834 0.7107 0.7164
Log Likelihood -35973.844 -36650.168 -29056.259 -36681.365 -17281.855 -17053.73 -17036.01
Column (1)-(4) display estimates using historical data without and with instruments. Column (5)-(7) display estimates from the 30-day randomized
price experiment. Column (2) uses cost as the instrument to price. Column (3) uses the Hausman style instrument: average prices of the same
product sold at other geographical locations by the same company. Because certain products are not sold at either of the other locations or off
shelf for most time during the study period (available less than one week during two months), price elasticity for these products are not available.
Column (4) uses one-day lagged price as instrument. In Columns (1)-(6), elasticityjA = βj(1− sjA), and ≈ βj if sjA is small. In Column (5),
elasticityjA =
βj
1−λ (1− sjA)− λ1−λβj(sjA +nsjA), where nsjA denotes the share of product j offered by retailer A within the product nest, i.e.,
the set of product j’s available at all retailers.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0,05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3 Competitor Price Responses to the Randomized Price Experiment
12-Hour Price Response
Competitor 1 Competitor 2 Competitor 3 Competitor 4
Our Price ↓ − ↑ ↓ − ↑ ↓ − ↑ ↓ − ↑ Total
↓ 1 74 0 5 66 4 3 68 4 6 67 2 75
− 4 275 4 15 258 10 19 256 8 8 263 12 283
↑ 0 91 0 4 80 7 7 81 3 6 84 1 91
Total 5 440 4 24 404 21 29 405 15 20 414 15 449
24-Hour Price Response
Competitor 1 Competitor 2 Competitor 3 Competitor 4
Our Price ↓ − ↑ ↓ − ↑ ↓ − ↑ ↓ − ↑ Total
↓ 1 72 2 9 59 7 3 61 11 7 66 2 75
− 4 273 5 20 243 19 28 232 22 15 254 13 282
↑ 0 90 1 5 75 11 11 71 9 9 80 2 91
Total 5 440 4 24 404 21 29 405 15 20 414 15 449
↓: Price decreases. ↑: Price increases. −: No price changes.
Figure 4 Model Goodness of Fit
Figure 5 Model Goodness of Fit by Sales Volume
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Table 4 Own and Cross-Price Elasticities
Product # Own Competitor 1 Competitor 2 Competitor 3 Competitor 4
1 -5.5378 -1.2071 -2.8775 -0.0055 -0.0001
2 -1.7681 -0.7598 -0.6386 -0.0012 0.0000
3 -5.4942 -0.0018 -0.0095 -0.0120 -0.0001
4 -0.0046 -0.0093 -0.0069 0.0000 0.0000
5 -1.5826 -0.4744 -0.7552 -0.0013 0.0000
6 -2.5504 -0.7253 -1.2292 -0.0020 -0.0001
7 -0.9213 -0.4088 -0.3209 -0.0006 0.0000
8 -3.6766 -1.8118 -1.0456 -0.0068 0.0000
9 -3.4141 -0.8532 -1.7617 -0.0023 -0.0001
10 -1.8954 -0.0883 -0.0164 -0.0069 0.0000
11 -2.4377 -0.9699 -0.9174 -0.0023 -0.0001
12 -8.2826 -1.5770 -4.9116 -0.0064 0.0000
13 -23.6245 -0.0152 -14.2382 -0.0138 -0.0022
14 -3.3974 -1.6779 -0.9875 -0.0051 -0.0001
15 -4.1404 -1.3791 -1.6345 -0.0094 -0.0001
Table 5 Best-Response Prices under Different Models
Competitor 1 Price Suggested Own Price Suggested Own Price
Ind. Demand Shocks Corr. Demand Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product # Day 1 Day 2 Day 1 Day 2 Day 1 Day 2
1 42.8 42.8 38.1 37.4 39.1 39.2
2 36.8 36.8 38.6 38.4 37.5 36.8
3 48.8 48.8 46.8 47.8 45.0 45.0
4 48.8 48.8 49.8 48.3 48.3 48.5
5 108.0 108.0 87.7 87.8 87.5 86.3
6 108.0 108.0 87.4 87.3 89.3 87.9
7 79.0 79.0 81.7 81.5 82.6 82.6
8 85.0 85.0 72.3 72.3 74.4 74.2
9 108.0 108.0 84.4 84.4 87.9 86.6
10 18.0 18.0 17.0 16.7 18.9 18.9
11 108.0 108.0 100.6 100.6 101.5 101.5
12 98.0 98.0 79.1 80.3 81.0 81.4
13 98.0 98.0 80.9 81.3 83.2 83.4
14 105.0 95.0 (↓10.0) 98.8 97.8 (↓1.0) 103.1 97.5 (↓5.6)
15 109.0 119.0 (↑10.0) 104.7 105.9 (↑1.2) 99.3 103.2 (↑3.9)
In this table, we illustrate our reactions in a real scenario where Competitor 1 reduces the price for product 14 by 10RMB, while raising the
price for product 15 by 10RMB from day 1 to day 2. All other competitors’ prices remain unchanged. We demonstrate that using the demand
model with independent demand shocks versus the demand model with correlated demand shocks yield very different price reactions. With
independent demand shocks, the algorithm suggests only a small change in our retail partner’s price in response: a decrease of only 1.0RMB for
product 14 and an increase of 1.2RMB for product 15. With correlated demand shocks, however, the algorithm suggests more sizable changes
in prices: a decrease of 5.6RMB for product 14 and an increase of 3.9RMB for product 15.
Table 6 Experiment Design: Test Best Response Pricing
Group 1 (Baby age: 0-6 months) Group 2 (Baby age: 7 months and above)
Week 0 Control Control
Week 1 Treatment Control
Week 2 Control Treatment
Week 3 Treatment Treatment
Week 4 Control Control
Control: current pricing practice. Treatment: best response pricing algorithm.
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Table 7 Revenue Impact of Best Response Pricing
(1) (2) (3)
ln(daily revenue) w/o daily margin and traffic w/ daily margin w/ daily margin & traffic
Treatment (α3) 0.109* 0.112* 0.124*
(0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
Group 1 Dummy -0.118*** -0.114*** -0.117***
(0.033) (0.037) (0.037)
No test week 1 Baseline
Test week 1 -0.284*** -0.283*** -0.283***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.068)
Test week 2 -0.112 -0.114 -0.124*
(0.073) (0.074) (0.075)
No test week 2 0.267*** 0.270*** 0.246***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052)
Test week 3 0.138** 0.136** 0.100
(0.059) (0.062) (0.065)
Location 2(BJ) -0.656*** -0.779*** -0.977*
(0.043) (0.139) (0.586)
Location 3(GZ) -1.257*** -1.282*** -2.026***
(0.047) (0.126) (0.726)
Daily margin -0.539 -0.363
(1.023) (1.057)
Location2(BJ) X Daily margin 1.683 1.504
(1.875) (1.921)
Location3(GZ) X Daily margin 0.314 0.402
(1.682) (1.643)
ln(Daily traffic) 0.020
(0.105)
Location2(BJ) X ln(Daily traffic) 0.062
(0.139)
Location3(GZ) X ln(Daily traffic) 0.216
(0.178)
day of week dummy yes yes yes
month dummy yes yes yes
const 7.976*** 8.017*** 7.922***
# obs 432 432 432
# treatment 38 38 38
R-sq 0.7322 0.733 0.7369
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0,05, * p < 0.1. Products and dates are dropped when the algorithm was wrongly or not implemented.
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Appendix A: Simulation: Comparison of Identification from Price Variation and
from Availability Variation
In this section, we present the details of the simulation we use to illustrate illustrate the impact of ignoring
stock-outs on the coefficient estimated. This simulation demonstrate that ignoring stock-outs can generate
biased and noisy estimates with large standard errors. This is particularly true when either of the following
holds: 1) the variation in prices is low, 2) correlation between competitor prices is high. Either scenario will
limit the presence of price variation. As the simulation illustrates, even though theoretically price variations
can serve as a source of identification, its power can be significantly impacted in practice. The limitation
is more prevalent when, these already limited price variations, have to serve as the source of identification
for two groups of parameters—both price elasticities and intercepts (product specific and retailer specific
intercepts).
We simulate a simple choice scenario with two retailers, R and C, where each retailer offer two products,
1 and 2, with the following parameters,
• product-specific intercepts α1 = 0.5, α2 = 1.5,
• product-specific price elasticity β1 =−0.5, β2 =−1,
• retailer-specific intercept αR = 0, αC = 0.2,
• extent of price comparison λ= 0.7,
• mean utility for the outside option equals 0.
We simulate 1) three levels of price variation: low, medium and high, i.e., coefficient of variation = 0.1,0.5,1,
respectively; 2) three levels of price correlation: low, medium and high, ρ= 0,0.5,0.8, respectively; and 3)
four levels of stock-out probability: zero, low, medium and high, 0%,5%,10%,20%, respectively. For each of
the 3*3*4=36 scenarios, we conduct 100 simulation rounds. In each round, we simulate purchases from 2,000
customers during a 30 day period. When estimating the model, we seed the estimation with 10 different
random initial values.
Without considering changes in availability, price variations across products and across retailers are the sole
source of variation for identification. If variation of prices is low or if competitor’s price is highly correlated
with its own price (i.e., relative price variation is low), ignoring changes in availability will lead to biased
and imprecise estimates. We make two observations from Table 8.
First, when variation of prices decreases, correlation of competitors’ prices increases, and stock-out prob-
ability increases, the average estimate from the 100 rounds of simulation deviates significantly from the true
parameters. For example, with low price variation, high competitor price correlation and high stock out
probability, the estimated αˆ1 =−0.17 (true value α1 = 0.5), αˆC = 0.05 (true value αC = 0.2). However, with
stock out information, the estimates are much closer to the true values, αˆ1 =−0.44 and αˆC = 0.24, for the
same sets of true values.
Second, when accounting for stock outs not only the estimates are closer to the true values but also
they are more precise. One can see that the estimates become much less precise as a whole as variation
of prices decreases, correlation of competitors’ prices increases, and stock-out probability increases. The
standard deviation of the 100 estimates increases sharply, from 0.20 to 10.70 in Column (1), for example.
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More importantly, even when there is zero stock out, low price variation and high price correlation lead to
imprecise estimates as well. For example, 100 rounds simulation yields a standard deviation of 0.23 with low
price variation and high competitor price correlation, almost eight times as large as the standard deviation
of 0.03 with high price variation and low competitor price correlation in Column (1). Figure 6 present the
estimates from Table 8 graphically, including the confidence interval of the estimates, where the benefits of
including the stock out infomraiton becomes evident.
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0Table 8 Estimation Results Based on 100 Simulations per Scenario
Ignore Stockouts Account for Stockouts
Price Comp Price Stockout α1 = 0.5 α2 = 1.5 β1 =−0.5 β2 =−1 αC = 0.2 λ= 0.7 α1 = 0.5 α2 = 1.5 β1 =−0.5 β2 =−1 αC = 0.2 λ= 0.7
Variation Correlation Probability (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
High Low Zero 0.38 (0.03) 1.46 (0.02) -0.57 (0.01) -1.11 (0.01) 0.21 (0.01) 0.29 (0.01) 0.38 (0.03) 1.46 (0.02) -0.57 (0.01) -1.11 (0.01) 0.21 (0.01) 0.29 (0.01)
High Low Low 0.35 (0.20) 1.37 (0.21) -0.59 (0.11) -1.07 (0.11) 0.22 (0.07) 0.62 (0.08) 0.38 (0.02) 1.45 (0.02) -0.57 (0.01) -1.11 (0.01) 0.21 (0.01) 0.71 (0.01)
High Low Medium 0.26 (0.35) 1.20 (0.36) -0.59 (0.14) -0.98 (0.16) 0.17 (0.13) 0.56 (0.11) 0.38 (0.02) 1.45 (0.02) -0.57 (0.01) -1.12 (0.01) 0.21 (0.01) 0.71 (0.01)
High Low High 0.04 (0.50) 0.89 (0.51) -0.62 (0.17) -0.88 (0.21) 0.13 (0.25) 0.45 (0.14) 0.38 (0.02) 1.46 (0.02) -0.57 (0.01) -1.12 (0.02) 0.21 (0.01) 0.70 (0.01)
High Medium Zero 0.38 (0.03) 1.46 (0.03) -0.58 (0.01) -1.13 (0.01) 0.22 (0.01) 0.30 (0.01) 0.38 (0.03) 1.46 (0.03) -0.58 (0.01) -1.13 (0.01) 0.22 (0.01) 0.30 (0.01)
High Medium Low 0.35 (0.23) 1.40 (0.25) -0.60 (0.10) -1.11 (0.10) 0.22 (0.08) 0.63 (0.08) 0.38 (0.03) 1.46 (0.03) -0.58 (0.01) -1.13 (0.02) 0.22 (0.01) 0.70 (0.01)
High Medium Medium 0.31 (0.34) 1.28 (0.36) -0.62 (0.12) -1.08 (0.14) 0.21 (0.13) 0.55 (0.11) 0.39 (0.03) 1.47 (0.02) -0.58 (0.01) -1.13 (0.01) 0.22 (0.01) 0.70 (0.01)
High Medium High 0.12 (0.44) 0.97 (0.47) -0.62 (0.14) -0.97 (0.18) 0.19 (0.23) 0.43 (0.15) 0.39 (0.02) 1.47 (0.03) -0.58 (0.01) -1.13 (0.02) 0.23 (0.01) 0.70 (0.01)
High High Zero 0.39 (0.03) 1.49 (0.03) -0.59 (0.01) -1.15 (0.02) 0.23 (0.01) 0.31 (0.01) 0.39 (0.03) 1.49 (0.03) -0.59 (0.01) -1.15 (0.02) 0.23 (0.01) 0.31 (0.01)
High High Low 0.32 (0.24) 1.42 (0.27) -0.61 (0.09) -1.15 (0.09) 0.23 (0.07) 0.63 (0.08) 0.39 (0.03) 1.49 (0.03) -0.59 (0.01) -1.15 (0.02) 0.23 (0.01) 0.69 (0.01)
High High Medium 0.25 (0.33) 1.34 (0.37) -0.61 (0.12) -1.13 (0.12) 0.23 (0.12) 0.57 (0.11) 0.40 (0.03) 1.49 (0.03) -0.59 (0.01) -1.15 (0.02) 0.23 (0.01) 0.69 (0.01)
High High High 0.09 (0.41) 1.06 (0.45) -0.60 (0.14) -1.08 (0.16) 0.22 (0.19) 0.47 (0.16) 0.40 (0.03) 1.50 (0.03) -0.59 (0.01) -1.15 (0.02) 0.23 (0.01) 0.69 (0.01)
Medium Low Zero 0.38 (0.04) 1.50 (0.03) -0.58 (0.01) -1.14 (0.02) 0.21 (0.01) 0.29 (0.01) 0.38 (0.04) 1.50 (0.03) -0.58 (0.01) -1.14 (0.02) 0.21 (0.01) 0.29 (0.01)
Medium Low Low 0.40 (0.24) 1.51 (0.25) -0.61 (0.12) -1.12 (0.11) 0.25 (0.07) 0.64 (0.06) 0.38 (0.03) 1.50 (0.03) -0.58 (0.01) -1.15 (0.02) 0.22 (0.01) 0.70 (0.01)
Medium Low Medium 0.34 (2.71) 1.41 (2.68) -0.63 (0.16) -1.11 (0.17) 0.23 (0.11) 0.59 (0.09) 0.38 (0.03) 1.51 (0.03) -0.58 (0.01) -1.15 (0.02) 0.22 (0.01) 0.70 (0.01)
Medium Low High 0.17 (2.59) 1.17 (2.53) -0.63 (0.23) -1.06 (0.27) 0.22 (0.22) 0.49 (0.14) 0.39 (0.02) 1.52 (0.03) -0.58 (0.01) -1.15 (0.02) 0.22 (0.01) 0.70 (0.01)
Medium Medium Zero 0.37 (0.04) 1.51 (0.04) -0.59 (0.01) -1.16 (0.02) 0.22 (0.01) 0.30 (0.01) 0.37 (0.04) 1.51 (0.04) -0.59 (0.01) -1.16 (0.02) 0.22 (0.01) 0.30 (0.01)
Medium Medium Low 0.37 (0.29) 1.50 (0.31) -0.60 (0.11) -1.16 (0.09) 0.23 (0.07) 0.64 (0.06) 0.38 (0.03) 1.52 (0.04) -0.59 (0.01) -1.16 (0.02) 0.22 (0.01) 0.70 (0.01)
Medium Medium Medium 0.37 (0.44) 1.45 (0.45) -0.61 (0.15) -1.16 (0.14) 0.25 (0.12) 0.59 (0.09) 0.39 (0.03) 1.53 (0.03) -0.59 (0.01) -1.16 (0.02) 0.22 (0.01) 0.70 (0.01)
Medium Medium High 0.17 (2.08) 1.22 (2.07) -0.61 (0.20) -1.13 (0.22) 0.23 (0.21) 0.50 (0.13) 0.40 (0.02) 1.53 (0.03) -0.59 (0.01) -1.16 (0.02) 0.23 (0.01) 0.69 (0.01)
Medium High Zero 0.39 (0.05) 1.54 (0.06) -0.60 (0.01) -1.18 (0.02) 0.23 (0.01) 0.31 (0.01) 0.39 (0.05) 1.54 (0.06) -0.60 (0.01) -1.18 (0.02) 0.23 (0.01) 0.31 (0.01)
Medium High Low 0.37 (0.30) 1.54 (0.33) -0.60 (0.10) -1.19 (0.09) 0.24 (0.07) 0.65 (0.06) 0.40 (0.04) 1.56 (0.05) -0.60 (0.01) -1.19 (0.02) 0.23 (0.01) 0.69 (0.01)
Medium High Medium 0.36 (0.45) 1.48 (0.49) -0.60 (0.14) -1.18 (0.13) 0.25 (0.12) 0.61 (0.09) 0.41 (0.03) 1.56 (0.04) -0.60 (0.01) -1.18 (0.02) 0.23 (0.01) 0.69 (0.01)
Medium High High 0.11 (0.59) 1.25 (0.65) -0.58 (0.19) -1.16 (0.18) 0.20 (0.21) 0.55 (0.14) 0.41 (0.03) 1.56 (0.04) -0.60 (0.01) -1.18 (0.02) 0.23 (0.01) 0.69 (0.01)
Low Low Zero 0.33 (0.15) 1.55 (0.17) -0.60 (0.04) -1.21 (0.07) 0.22 (0.03) 0.31 (0.02) 0.33 (0.16) 1.55 (0.17) -0.60 (0.04) -1.21 (0.07) 0.21 (0.03) 0.31 (0.02)
Low Low Low 0.49 (3.35) 1.92 (3.35) -0.58 (0.29) -1.31 (0.40) 0.23 (0.19) 0.64 (0.12) 0.41 (0.07) 1.64 (0.12) -0.60 (0.04) -1.22 (0.06) 0.24 (0.02) 0.69 (0.02)
Low Low Medium 0.41 (8.92) 1.72 (8.89) -0.54 (0.45) -1.26 (0.52) 0.19 (0.28) 0.65 (0.18) 0.42 (0.06) 1.65 (0.10) -0.61 (0.04) -1.22 (0.05) 0.24 (0.02) 0.68 (0.02)
Low Low High 0.43 (7.59) 1.89 (12.16) -0.53 (0.77) -1.38 (0.82) 0.07 (0.45) 0.63 (0.32) 0.43 (0.05) 1.64 (0.08) -0.61 (0.04) -1.22 (0.04) 0.24 (0.01) 0.68 (0.01)
Low Medium Zero 0.34 (0.21) 1.56 (0.24) -0.61 (0.04) -1.22 (0.06) 0.22 (0.05) 0.31 (0.02) 0.34 (0.18) 1.55 (0.20) -0.61 (0.04) -1.23 (0.06) 0.22 (0.04) 0.31 (0.02)
Low Medium Low 0.34 (7.41) 1.67 (7.45) -0.57 (0.28) -1.22 (0.34) 0.24 (0.22) 0.66 (0.12) 0.42 (0.08) 1.65 (0.12) -0.61 (0.04) -1.23 (0.06) 0.24 (0.02) 0.68 (0.02)
Low Medium Medium 0.26 (11.12) 1.65 (11.05) -0.54 (0.47) -1.23 (0.45) 0.18 (0.28) 0.66 (0.18) 0.44 (0.06) 1.68 (0.09) -0.62 (0.04) -1.23 (0.05) 0.24 (0.02) 0.68 (0.02)
Low Medium High -0.02 (7.52) 1.29 (7.47) -0.56 (0.80) -1.29 (0.62) 0.07 (6.20) 0.64 (0.44) 0.43 (0.05) 1.66 (0.07) -0.62 (0.04) -1.22 (0.04) 0.24 (0.01) 0.68 (0.01)
Low High Zero 0.34 (0.23) 1.55 (0.26) -0.61 (0.05) -1.23 (0.06) 0.22 (0.05) 0.32 (0.02) 0.34 (0.23) 1.56 (0.27) -0.61 (0.05) -1.24 (0.06) 0.22 (0.05) 0.32 (0.02)
Low High Low 0.35 (6.74) 1.68 (6.77) -0.55 (0.34) -1.22 (0.33) 0.24 (0.25) 0.67 (0.14) 0.43 (0.08) 1.66 (0.11) -0.61 (0.05) -1.24 (0.06) 0.24 (0.02) 0.68 (0.02)
Low High Medium 0.03 (7.45) 1.38 (7.49) -0.56 (0.56) -1.25 (0.44) 0.17 (0.31) 0.70 (0.22) 0.45 (0.06) 1.68 (0.09) -0.62 (0.05) -1.24 (0.05) 0.24 (0.02) 0.68 (0.02)
Low High High -0.17 (10.70) 1.26 (10.60) -0.53 (0.91) -1.25 (0.60) 0.05 (2.27) 0.64 (2.96) 0.44 (0.06) 1.66 (0.07) -0.62 (0.05) -1.23 (0.04) 0.24 (0.02) 0.68 (0.01)
Note: average estimates from all 100 simulations are listed outside parentheses, while standard deviations are inside parentheses.
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Figure 6 Estimation Results Based on 100 Simulations per Scenario
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